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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper is motivated by the spectacular financial crises in developing countries that have 
taken place in the last 15 years.  Our central objective is to try to isolate the role of domestic 
financial factors, in particular the role of foreign-exchange denominated debts and financial 
integration in world capital markets.  The approach is eminently empirical, and it focuses on 
Sudden Stops episodes in which the economy exhibits a “large and largely unexpected” decline 
in capital inflows.  In particular, we focus on “systemic” Sudden Stops (3S), i.e., Sudden Stops 
that take place in conjunction with a sharp rise in aggregate interest-rate spreads. 
Consequently, these are episodes for which it could be claimed that the initial trigger is 
financial and external.  Thus, the procedure we use to select Sudden Stop episodes is designed to 
exclude crises that are idiosyncratic and can be due to factors quite distinct (like natural disasters 
or political turmoil) from the purely financial ones that we intend to isolate.  Moreover, since our 
crisis definition tries to isolate episodes that are “largely unexpected,” it could be argued that in 
these episodes market incompleteness is likely to prevail, making shocks such as large changes 
in relative prices difficult to manage in a context of non-contingent contracts. 
The simple model discussed in Section 2 captures these characteristics by assuming that 
3S are initially triggered by factors that are exogenous to individual economies.  However, 
whether or not this initial shock develops into a full-fledged Sudden Stop depends also on 
country-specific variables.  We conjecture that foreign-currency denominated debts play a 
central role in this respect, especially when the Sudden Stop brings about a sharp increase in the 
real exchange rate.  This is so because central banks have serious limitations as lenders of last 
resort in terms of foreign exchange.  In the empirical implementation we focus on an even 
narrower concept of foreign-exchange denominated debt, namely, Domestic Liability 
Dollarization (DLD), i.e., foreign-exchange denominated domestic debts towards the domestic 
banking system, as a share of GDP.  The rationale behind this choice is that typically banks are at 
the heart of the economy’s payment system and, thus, their bankruptcy or even temporary 
suspension of activities could trigger a serious supply shock.  In addition, those crises are in 
many cases associated with major real currency depreciation. Thus, it is necessary to bring into 
focus factors that could provoke large increases in the real exchange rate.  The framework 
introduced below shows that a key factor is the current account deficit as a share of absorption 
of tradable goods, which is shown to be negatively related to the ratio of tradables’ output (net of   5
transfers) to tradables’ absorption (a variable that we denote by ω; see Sections 2 and 4 for 
details).
1  The smaller is ω, the larger will be the impact on tradables’ absorption of a Sudden 
Stop (keeping international reserves constant) and, thus, the larger its impact on the real 
exchange rate.  The model therefore leads us to expect that the probability of a Sudden Stop will 
be negatively associated with ω and positively associated with DLD (given the exogenous 
financial trigger), bringing to the forefront the relevance of potential balance-sheet effects on the 
likelihood of a Sudden Stop. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 discusses a basic framework that helps to 
identify the variables that determine the change in the real exchange rate (RER), which is at the 
heart of our empirical analysis. Section 3 develops an empirical definition and characterization of 
Sudden Stops and links this definition to the empirical literature on crises.  Section 4 focuses on 
an empirical analysis of the determinants of Sudden Stops, following a panel Probit approach, 
and highlights the impact of balance-sheet effects.  Section 5 concludes with a description of our 
main findings and future lines of research. 
 
2. Basic Framework  
 
The objective of this section is to motivate a set of key macro variables used in the empirical 
exploration.  As noted in the Introduction, we will focus on cases in which it can be argued that 
the initial shock is systemic and is associated with a sharp increase in the cost of credit, initially 
inducing substantial contraction in international credit and aggregate demand.  Whether or not 
this initial credit contraction results in a full-fledged Sudden Stop depends on the effects of the 
initial contraction, which in turn depend on domestic vulnerabilities. 
Consider the case in which there are two sectors, tradables and nontradables, and the 
following demand function for nontradables holds: 
h = α + β rer + δ z,        (1) 
where h = log H, z = log Z, rer = log RER, H and Z are the demand for nontradables (or home 
goods) and tradables, RER is the real exchange rate (i.e., the relative price of tradables with 
                                                 
1 The variable ω is a measure of the economy’s ability to finance domestic absorption of tradable goods.  Although 
it could be claimed that ω is a measure of trade openness, it should be noted that it is significantly different from the 
standard one, i.e., the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (see Section 4 for more details).   6
respect to nontradables), and α,β, and δ are parameters, β > 0, δ > 0.
2  Suppose for simplicity that 
the supply of tradables and non-tradables is inelastically given.  Thus, by equation (1), if z 
contracts by Δz, in equilibrium we have  
, z rer Δ
β
δ
− = Δ       (2) 
where Δ is the first-difference operator. Clearly, the larger is the proportional contraction of the 
demand for tradables, the larger will be the proportional increase in the real exchange rate.  
Changes in rer, in turn, change the ratio of foreign-exchange denominated debt to GDP 
(assuming that those debts are not state-contingent, which is justified by looking at episodes 
where capital flow cuts are large and can be presumed to be largely unexpected).  Thus, given a 
positive stock of foreign-exchange denominated debt, the larger Δrer, the larger will be the 
probability of financial distress.  This illustrates how a systemic financial shock could create 
financial domestic distress, especially if the foreign-denominated debt is owed to domestic 
banks, as noted in the Introduction.
3 
  The next step is to trace the effect of credit contraction on z.  It should be clear from the 
start that such an effect will depend on preexisting debt maturity structure and central bank 
policy with respect to international reserves, subjects that we do not address here.  Instead, the 
ensuing discussion suggests that a plausible proxy for the initial impact of a credit drought is the 
ratio of the prior-to-shock current account deficit to the absorption of tradable goods.  Let the 
current account deficit, capital inflows, and international reserves be denoted by CAD, KI, and R, 
respectively.  By definition, and abstracting from errors and omissions,  
 
KI = CAD + ΔR = Z – Y + S + ΔR      (3) 
 
 
where Y is output of tradables and S are international factor payments, remittances abroad, etc.  
Let us focus on the case in which the initial or incipient Sudden Stop results in zero capital 
inflows, i.e., KI = 0.  If CAD remains constant (and positive), then, by equation (3), ΔR < 0, 
driving the economy into a balance-of-payments crisis beyond which the whole adjustment will 
have to fall upon CAD.  Hence, there will come a time at which CAD will have to be set equal to 
                                                 
2 This equation could be derived from first principles if H and Z are identified with consumption of nontradables and 
tradables, the intertemporal utility function is separable, and the utility function is iso-elastic in H and Z. 
3 It should be pointed out, however, that a large increase in rer is likely to generate financial difficulties even when 
there are no foreign-exchange denominated debts, e.g., the case of firms that depend on imported raw materials.   7
zero.  Thus, in the plausible case in which the economy initially attempts to honor its external 
financial obligations (i.e., S remains largely constant), then, in the most favorable case in which 
Y does not contract as a result of the credit drought, we must eventually have  
 
ΔZ = –  CAD;      (4) 
thus, 
– ΔZ / Z = CAD / Z .     (5) 
 
Approximating the relative change in Z by its first difference in logs, it follows from 







= Δ       (6) 
Thus, by equation (6), the potential proportional change in the real exchange rate increases with 
CAD prior to the Sudden Stop, as a ratio to the absorption of tradables (Z).  Given that Y is 
unchanged⎯and in some Sudden Stop episodes Y falls (it never rises)⎯equation (6) gives a 
lower bound for the required proportional increase in the real exchange rate.
4  It should be 
emphasized that equation (6) does not model the actual change in the equilibrium real exchange 
rate but, rather, that part of the total change that is likely to be very difficult to prevent.  We are 
now ready to complete the framework that will help to rationalize Sudden Stops as defined in the 
empirical section.   
  Consider a scenario in which a shock is spread from one country to other regions, for 
example, because of prevailing regulations in capital market transactions (such as margin calls) 
that are unrelated to country fundamentals.  Such a possibility is discussed in Calvo (1999), 
where it is argued that a liquidity shock to informed investors due to adverse developments in 
one country
5 may trigger sales of assets from other countries in their portfolio in order to restore 
liquidity.  Now add to this framework a set of uninformed investors who face a signal-extraction 
problem because they cannot observe whether sales of the informed are motivated by lower 
                                                 
4 In a world of heterogeneous agents, full-fledged Sudden Stops could take place even under current account 
surplus, because there could be key sectors that exhibit a current account deficit while the rest of the economy 
exhibits an even larger surplus.  In our sample, about 5 percent of Sudden Stops occur under a current account 
surplus in the period prior to crisis.  This is another reason why equation (6) is likely to underestimate the required 
change in RER of an incipient Sudden Stop.   
5  Say, a margin call due to the fall in the price of asset holdings from a particular country.   8
returns on projects or by the informed facing margin calls.  In this context, uninformed investors 
may easily interpret the fact that informed investors stay out of the market for emerging market 
(EM) securities, or massive asset sales, as an indication of lower returns and decide to get rid of 
their holdings as well, even though the cause for informed investors’ sales was indeed due to 
margin calls.
6  When this occurs, a set of countries with no ties to the country at the epicenter of 
the crisis could be exposed to a large and unexpected liquidity shock making their equilibrium 
real exchange rate rise through the mechanism discussed above.  This is an example of the 
exogenous trigger we have been referring to above.  Thus, if, as a result, the proportional change 
in RER is large and the economy exhibits high DLD, for example, massive bankruptcies might 
ensue, generating a full-fledged Sudden Stop.  
  The negative effect of a rise in RER can be rationalized in a variety of different ways.  
For example, although they do not deal with bankruptcies, models such as Izquierdo (1999) or 
Arellano and Mendoza (2002) help rationalize the effects of changes in the RER on output via 
external credit contraction, where the relevant price is that of non-tradable collateral relative to 
the tradable good being produced.  Another scenario is given in Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee 
(2001), a paper that is close in spirit to the present discussion because it specifically analyzes the 
effects of liability dollarization.  The paper exploits the fact that with incomplete pass-through 
from exchange rates to domestic prices, currency depreciation impacts negatively on net worth 
due to the increase in the debt burden of domestic firms indebted in foreign currency, thus 
reducing investment by constrained firms as well as output levels in future periods.  The 
associated fall in future money demand and consequent future currency depreciation, coupled 
with arbitrage in the foreign exchange rate market, implies that currency depreciation must take 
place in the current period as well, opening the door for expectational shocks that could push an 
economy into a bad (low output) equilibrium.
7 
8  Therefore, given the damaging effect of real 
                                                 
6 This can occur when the variance of returns to investment projects in EMs is high relative to the variance of the 
liquidity shock to informed investors (see Calvo, 1999). 
7 Sudden Stops could also be rationalized in terms of models displaying a unique equilibrium, as long as the 
equilibrium outcome is a discontinuous function of fundamentals.  For example, Calvo (2003) shows that there 
could exist a critical level of government debt beyond which the economy plunges into an equilibrium that displays 
Sudden Stop features. Calvo (2003) is a non-monetary model, where public debt is denominated in terms of 
tradables.  Thus, Liability Dollarization is actually assumed for the entire debt, implying that the higher the degree 
of Liability Dollarization (measured in this model by the public debt/output ratio), the higher the probability that a 
given negative shock will generate a Sudden Stop. 
8 Uniqueness could also be obtained along the lines suggested by Morris and Shin (1998).  Consider the limit case in 
which informational noise (ε in their notation) goes to zero, and let currency devaluation after the crisis be an   9
exchange rate fluctuations on balance sheets, output and repayment capacity, it can be argued 
that the probability of a 3S episode will be an increasing function of CAD/Z, and the degree of 
Liability Dollarization, especially Domestic Liability Dollarization, DLD, among possibly other 
variables.
9  This is the central conjecture that will be put to a test in the next sections.  
  In closing this section, it is worth pointing out that following the empirical literature on 
these issues we also include as an explanatory variable a measure of financial integration with 
the rest of the world.  Interestingly, empirical results suggest that such a variable might increase 
the probability of Sudden Stop in the first stages of financial integration, while it might decrease 
the probability of Sudden Stop for highly financially integrated economies.  The result is 
intuitively plausible given that, in the first place, to suffer from Sudden Stop economies must 
exhibit  some degree of financial integration.  Thus, financial integration must, in principle, 
increase the probability of Sudden Stop.  However, for highly financially integrated economies 
the latter effect could be more than offset by the existence of a better institutional framework 
(with better quality creditor rights), or state-contingent financial instruments which, by providing 
more orderly instruments for adjustment, lower the probability of Sudden Stop.  
 
3.  Sudden Stops: Definition and Characterization 
 
Recent empirical literature has focused on alternative measures of crisis, whether currency crises 
(Frankel and Rose, 1996;
10 Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999;
11 Edwards, 2001;
12 Arteta, 2003;   
Razin and Rubinstein, 2004
13) or current account reversals (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 2000;   
Edwards (2003)).  However, to the extent that many of the recent crises were originated by credit 
shocks in international markets, as argued in Calvo (1999), the measure of crisis we want to 
consider in this case is more closely linked to large and unexpected capital account movements 
rather than to measures that focus on large nominal currency fluctuations or current account 
                                                                                                                                                             
increasing function of the degree of Liability Dollarization.  In this case, the likelihood of a crisis as a result of a 
deterioration in fundamentals (θ in their notation) would be higher, the higher the degree of Liability Dollarization.  
9 For an explicit derivation of the relationship between CAD/Z and 1-ω, see section IV. 
10 Using a panel of 105 countries for the period 1970-1991, they conclude that the current account has no 
significance in explaining currency crises.   
11 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) implicitly introduce a link between current account performance and currency 
crises by incorporating the growth rate of imports and exports in their analysis.  They select the latter as a relevant 
early warning indicator of currency crises based on noise-to-signal ratio properties of the series. 
12 This analysis does find that under some definitions of currency crisis, and particularly excluding African 
countries, current account deficits are a significant determinant of the probability of experiencing currency crises. 
13 They focus on large RER swings to define a crisis.    10
reversals (along these lines, Edwards, 2004, makes a relevant distinction between current 
account reversals and capital account reversals).  Besides, current account and exchange rate 
behavior may be more affected by endogenous policy choices than Systemic Sudden Stops, 
which are, by definition, triggered by large and largely exogenous aggregate interest rate spreads.  
Thus, Systemic Sudden Stops may imply quite different timings for the onset of a crisis 
compared to exchange rate crises or current account reversals.
14 
One indicator of financial crisis that is akin to ours is the one advanced by Rodrik and 
Velasco (1999)⎯which, in turn, draws from Radelet and Sachs (1998).  According to their 
definition, financial crisis takes place when there is a sharp reversal in net private foreign capital 
flows.
15  However, this indicator does not attempt to capture the “unexpected” component in 
Sudden Stops, and it does not discriminate between episodes that may be of a domestic origin 
from those of a systemic (and, hence, largely exogenous) origin.  In contrast to this approach, as 
well as that of Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), our indicator of Sudden Stop focuses on 
capital account reversals that coincide with sharp increases in aggregate spreads.  This is done in 
order to pinpoint crises that are highly likely to be associated with an external trigger that is 
systemic in nature⎯i.e., Systemic Sudden Stops.  It is important to notice that the 3S definition 
in the present paper drops the requirement in Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) that capital 
account reversals coincide with a fall in output, thus reducing the potential influence of domestic 
factors in the definition and helping to focus on external triggers.
16  
Rothenberg and Warnock (2006) build on Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejía (2004) to explore 
differences between capital account reversals originated in capital flow transactions attributable 
to non-residents vis-à-vis those attributable to residents, based on the finding by Cowan and De 
Gregorio (2005) that for the case of Chile, much of the movement in the capital account balance 
is due to changes in gross flows stemming from residents.  For a restricted sample of countries, 
they find that many of the net capital flow reversals are due to transactions made by residents 
(although more than half of their episodes are still due to transactions made by foreigners).  
However, their definition of sudden stops does not require coincidence with a spike in aggregate 
                                                 
14 According to our definition, for example, Argentina’s Sudden Stop starts in May of 1999, whereas the currency 
crisis only hits in February of 2002.  
15 Exceeding 5 percent of GDP. 
16 Moreover, this study expands the sample of countries from 32 to 110 given availability of new data on 
dollarization.  Additionally, given the larger and more heterogeneous sample, controls for financial integration are 
introduced in estimations, with significant results reported in Section 4.    11
EMBI spreads and thus may be capturing several events of a domestic nature.  We do not follow 
this approach, not only because our definition likely excludes crises of a domestic origin, but 
also because of insufficient data availability on gross flows at a monthly frequency for the much 
larger sample of countries used in this study.
17 
Against this empirical background, and following Calvo (1998), we look for measures of 
a Sudden Stop that reflect large and unexpected falls in capital inflows, a central element in the 
characterization of this type of event.  In order to make the concept of Sudden Stop operational, 
we first define a Sudden Stop as a phase that meets the following conditions:  
 
•  It contains at least one observation where the year-on-year fall in capital flows 
lies at least two standard deviations below its sample mean (this addresses the 
“unexpected” requirement of a Sudden Stop).
18 
•  The Sudden Stop phase ends once the annual change in capital flows exceeds 
one standard deviation below its sample mean. This will generally introduce 
persistence, a common fact of Sudden Stops. 
•  Moreover, for the sake of symmetry, the start of a Sudden Stop phase is 
determined by the first time the annual change in capital flows falls one 
standard deviation below the mean.
19 
 
Notice that there is an important difference between this concept of crisis and the one 
used in other studies focusing on measures such as a fixed current account deficit threshold as a 
share of GDP in that, in line with the theoretical arguments outlined in the previous section, our 
definition accounts for the volatility of capital flow fluctuations of each particular country at 
each point in time in deciding whether an event is “large and unexpected.”   If anything, 
our concept of crisis will tend to include episodes that would otherwise not qualify for crisis 
when using measures such as a fixed current account deficit threshold. 
                                                 
17 Besides, as it will be come evident later on, from an integrated capital market perspective, it is not crucial whether 
domestic or foreign investors are responsible for the cut in financing in terms of the consequences that the 
withdrawal of funds will pose on the real exchange rate and the associated balance-sheet effects. 
18 Both the first and second moments of the series are calculated each period using an expanding window with a 
minimum of 24 (months of) observations and a start date fixed at January 1990.  This intends to capture a learning 
process or updating of the behavior of the series. 
19 As a result, a Sudden Stop phase starts with a fall in capital flows exceeding one standard deviation, followed by a 
fall of two standard deviations.  The process lasts until the change in capital flows is greater than minus one standard 
deviation.        12
 This is so because the latter would exclude many crisis episodes in developed countries 
simply because their volatility is smaller. 
To maximize the chances of detecting Sudden Stop episodes accurately, we work with 
monthly data, since lower frequency data may blur the beginning of these episodes.  Assessing 
the right timing of these episodes is relevant because, as it will become clear later on, eventual 
changes in the RER that may result from potential closure of the current account deficit need to 
be measured before a Sudden Stop takes place.  Given that capital account information is 
typically not available at this frequency, we construct a capital flow proxy by netting out the 
trade balance from changes in foreign reserves (both net factor income and current transfers are 
thus included in our measure of capital flows, but since they represent mostly interest payments 
on long-term debt, they should not vary so substantially as to introduce significant spurious 
volatility into our capital flows measure).
20  Changes in the 12-month cumulative measure of the 
capital flow proxy are taken on a yearly basis to avoid seasonal fluctuations. 
As indicated in the introduction, our interest lies in the identification of Systemic Sudden 
Stops (or 3S), i.e., Sudden Stops with an exogenous trigger.  For this reason, we require 
additionally that the detected Sudden Stop windows coincide with a period of skyrocketing 
aggregate spreads.  The same methodology outlined above to detect large changes in capital 
flows is used for aggregate spreads to detect periods of capital market turmoil.
21       
In order to make the analysis as exhaustive as possible, we work with a sample of 110 
countries, including 21 developed economies, and 89 developing countries for the period 1990-
2004 (see the Data Appendix for details).
22  The set of countries and years in the sample is 
essentially restricted by availability of DLD data.  
Two periods of financial turmoil for developing countries are detected in our sample, 
namely, the neighborhood of the Tequila crisis (1994-1995), and the neighborhood of the East 
Asian-Russian Crisis (1998-1999).  For the case of developed countries, financial turmoil is 
                                                 
20 See the Data Appendix for definitions and sources of these variables.  All series are measured in constant 2000 US 
dollars.  
21 More specifically, we use J. P. Morgan’s Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spread over US Treasury bonds 
for developing countries, the Merrill Lynch Euro-area Government Index spreads for Euro-area countries (as well as 
Nordic countries such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), and G7 Government Index spreads for all remaining 
developed countries. 
22 The first two years of observations are lost, given that such information is used to construct initial standard 
deviations.    13
detected for 1992, reflecting the ERM crisis.  Throughout these periods, a total of 77 3S are 
accounted for.  A list of episodes is provided in Appendix Table 1. 
Our interest and the nature of our methodology to detect 3S, focusing on periods of 
widespread financial turmoil, bunches episodes “by construction.”  However, it is worth asking 
whether bunching takes place when only large changes in capital flows are considered⎯i.e., 
without imposing overlap with large fluctuations in aggregate spreads.  Figure 1 displays the 
share of economies included in the EMBI+ index as well as other developing countries that 
experienced large changes in capital flows across time.
23  Bunching seems evident for EMBI+ 
countries, particularly around the Tequila crisis and the East Asian-Russian crisis (the two 
systemic events captured by large fluctuations in aggregate EMBI spreads), whereas there is no 
such clear bunching pattern for other developing countries, supporting the conjecture that EMs 
are particularly prone to contemporaneous, systemic events (our estimations will show that 
financial integration may be behind these results, as the probability of a 3S increases with 
financial integration in the early stages of integration).  Given the heterogeneous nature of EMs 
in terms of their fiscal stance and other macroeconomic measures, it would be hard to argue that 
there was a common flaw in fundamentals driving these episodes, other than the fact that they 
are all EMs.
24  This suggests that these episodes were not necessarily crises just waiting to 
happen⎯but rather, that they were triggered by an external event⎯although there may be factors 
that made them more prone to crisis, an issue that we raise in the following section. 
 
                                                 
23 The distinction between EMBI+ and other developing countries is made because their levels of financial 
integration differ and, thus, bunching behavior may differ. 
24 For a detailed treatment of the Latin American episodes see Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002).   14
Figure 1. The Bunching of Sudden Stops Events: 

















Note: For each group of countries, this figure displays the share of economies 
that experienced large changes in capital flows across time. 
 
Another topic that is relevant to the hypothesis advanced in this study is whether Sudden 
Stop episodes have been associated with large RER depreciation⎯where large RER depreciation 
windows are defined along the same lines used to identify periods of large changes in capital 
flows.  To this effect, we look at the share of 3S associated with large RER depreciation⎯i.e., 
the number of 3S windows that overlap with large RER depreciation windows, relative to the 
number of 3S events.  We find that 55 percent of 3S episodes can be linked to large RER 
depreciation, indicating that this large valuation element of balance sheet effects cannot be 
ignored. 
 
4. Determinants of Sudden Stops: Empirical Analysis 
 
Having defined Sudden Stops and examined some of their empirical characteristics, we now turn 
to a search for Sudden Stop determinants.  The framework discussed in Section 3 suggests 
balance-sheet factors that exacerbate an economy’s vulnerability to Sudden Stops:  The degree of 
domestic liability dollarization (both in the private and public sectors), as well as the sensitivity 
of the real exchange rate (RER) to capital flow reversals, which is related to the size of the 
%   15
supply of tradable goods relative to demand for tradable goods.  The latter becomes clear by 
examining equation (6), which shows that the size of the increase in the RER depends on the 
percentage fall in the absorption of tradables needed to close the current account gap (CAD/Z).
25  
As a matter of fact, the less leveraged the absorption of tradable goods is, the smaller will be the 













,      (7) 
where  ω, defined as  () Z S Y / − = ω , can be though of as the un-leveraged absorption of 
tradables.  It is evident that the higher the supply of tradables ( ) Y , the smaller will be financing 
from abroad (or leverage) of the absorption of tradables.  Thus, high values of 1-ω mean that a 
country relies less on its own financing of the absorption of tradables and is therefore more 
vulnerable to RER depreciation stemming from closure of the current account gap.  Notice that 
the denominator in (7) is the absorption of tradables, and not GDP.  This points to the fact that 
normalization of the current account deficit by the absorption of tradables may be more suitable 
than normalization by GDP when analyzing vulnerability to Sudden Stops. 
In order to construct a measure of 1-ω , the first component of balance-sheet effects 
tracking potential changes in RER, we need to obtain a value for the absorption of tradable goods 
(Z), which is composed of imports plus a fraction of the supply of tradable goods.  We do this by 
proxying tradable output by the sum of agriculture plus industrial output, i.e., we exclude 
services from total output.  Next, we obtain the fraction of tradable output consumed 
domestically by subtracting exports from tradable output, and adding imports to the latter in 
order to obtain a measure of Z.  Having computed values for Z, and using CAD data, we obtain 
values for 1-ω as indicated by equation (7). (See the Data Appendix for details on definitions and 
sources for all the variables used in this section).         
Our empirical strategy also highlights DLD, the second component of potential balance 
sheet effects, a phenomenon rarely considered in empirical studies of crises determination, with a 
few exceptions such as Arteta (2003), who explores the significance of Liability Dollarization in 
explaining the likelihood of a currency crisis.  Interestingly, he finds no significant role for 
Liability Dollarization.  This result is not incompatible with our findings below, given that we do 
                                                 
25 An increase means a real depreciation of the currency.   16
not focus on currency crises, and, as stated earlier, the timing of currency crises may be quite 
different from that of Sudden Stops.  Moreover, as will become clear later on, our measure of 
dollarization is different.
26  A previous version of our study (Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004)) 
was the first to introduce the concept of DLD in determining the probability of a crisis.  Here we 
conduct a much more comprehensive analysis by including a larger set of 110 countries for 
which DLD data is now available.
27 
  For developed countries, DLD is defined as Bank for International Settlements-reporting 
banks’ local asset positions in foreign currency as a share of GDP.  Such data are not available 
for EMs, so we construct a proxy by adding up dollar deposits and domestic banks’ foreign 
borrowing as a share of GDP.  This measure should be a good proxy for liability dollarization, 
under the assumption that banks have a tendency to match the size of their assets and liabilities 
for each currency denomination.
28  Data on dollar deposits are from Levy Yeyati (2006), who, in 
turn, builds upon the dataset used by Honohan and Shi (2002).  Data on bank foreign borrowing 
are obtained from IMF IFS (see the Data Appendix for a full description). 
Notice that, in contrast to measures of DLD previously used in the literature⎯e.g., 
scaling dollar credit as a share of total credit, or dollar deposits as a share of total deposits (as in 
Arteta (2003))⎯we rely on liability dollarization as a share of GDP.  This is particularly relevant 
to capture the fact that even though financial systems may not be heavily dollarized when 
considering the share of dollar liabilities in total liabilities, the size of the banking system may be 
sufficiently large that dollar liabilities as a share of GDP constitute a sizeable burden to the 
economy in the event of a large RER depreciation.  For example, a region like East Asia, where 
the share of dollar liabilities in total liabilities was not large, is at a par with Latin America, 
where the share of dollar liabilities is big, yet the size of the banking system is small.  One 
problem with this measure is that ideally one would like to capture only foreign-exchange 
denominated loans to nontradable sectors.  This would not be a major problem if the share of 
foreign-exchange denominated loans to non-tradables in total foreign-exchange denominated 
                                                 
26 Our sample of countries is also different and much larger than that in Arteta (2003). 
27 In a related study, Cavallo and Frankel (2004), using a similar definition of Sudden Stop to that in Calvo, 
Izquierdo and Mejía (2004), also introduce measures of dollarization more akin to those in Arteta (2003).  These 
alternative measures provide mixed results in terms of their contribution to the likelihood of a Sudden Stop.  It is 
also worth mentioning that our approach focuses on the impact of dollarization on the likelihood of a Sudden Stop, 
rather than on the consequences of dollarization and Sudden Stops on relevant variables such as economic growth, 
as in Edwards (2003). 
28 Evidence on currency matching of bank assets and liabilities for EMs can be found in IDB (2004).    17
loans were about the same across countries.  Preliminary evidence for a small subset of countries 
for which information is available suggests that there is a positive correlation between the degree 
of DLD and the share of dollar loans to non-tradable sectors in total dollar loans, possibly 
reflecting the fact that nontradable sectors are a major client of domestic banking systems.
29 
Another possibility that would validate our procedure is that in the short run most goods are de 
facto nontradable.  This has some support in recent crisis episodes in which affected countries 
saw export credit dry up, seriously impairing their ability to export even though large currency 
devaluation made exports extremely competitive (e.g., Korea and Thailand in 1997, and Brazil in 
2002).  
Our estimation procedure uses as a benchmark a panel Probit model that approximates 
the probability of falling into a full-fledged 3S episode as a function of lagged values of 1-ω and 
DLD, controlling for a set of macroeconomic variables typically used in the literature on 
determinants of crises⎯which we describe later⎯ and time effects using year dummies.
30  We 
use random effects to control for heterogeneity across panel members.
31 
In order to reduce endogeneity issues, and given that many of the variables used in our 
estimations come at an annual frequency, we switch to lagged yearly data.
32   We are particularly 
interested in lagged 1-ω because it proxies for the potential change in relative prices that could 
occur were the country to face an incipient Sudden Stop (recall the discussion in Section III), 
something that would not be conveyed by contemporaneous 1-ω once the current account gap is 
closed and relative prices have adjusted.  
A first set of regression results is presented in Appendix Table 2 (robustness checks, 
focusing on potential endogeneity issues between lagged 1-ω and the latent variable behind the 
construction of the Sudden Stop indicator, as well as estimations that focus only on developing 
countries are presented later in Appendix Tables 3 through 5).  They indicate that both 1-ω and 
DLD are significant at the 1 percent level in most specifications. These results withstand the 
                                                 
29 Based on information used in IDB (2004). 
30 The use of a Probit model and the construction of a dichotomous Sudden Stop variable are due to our belief that 
large and unexpected capital flow reversals have non-linear effects, as they trigger substantial balance-sheet 
fluctuations that may lead to serious credit constraints or outright bankruptcies.  An alternative, which is not 
explored in this paper, would be to use regime-switching models. 
31 Particular attention will be paid to estimation problems that arise from the inclusion of potentially endogenous 
variables within a Probit with random effects.  See both the robustness section as well as the Technical Appendix for 
a discussion. 
32 Except for terms-of-trade growth, a variable that enters contemporaneously in our estimations.   18
inclusion of a set of control variables typically used in the literature, including measures of 
financial integration such as the stock of FDI assets plus liabilities (as a share of GDP) and the 
stock of portfolio assets plus liabilities (as a share of GDP), terms of trade growth, the public 
sector balance and public external debt (all expressed as shares of GDP), the ratio of M2 to 
international reserves, as well as two different measures of exchange rate flexibility, and a 
developing country dummy (see columns 2 to 10 of Appendix Table 2).  
Balance-sheet effects can be assessed by focusing on the interaction of ω and DLD, 
which is particularly amenable to Probit models given their non-linear nature.  We find that the 
effects of ω on the probability of a Sudden Stop crucially depend on the degree of DLD.  Low 
values of ω (high leverage of CAD) imply a higher probability of Sudden Stop, but this is 
particularly so for dollarized economies.  These effects are not only statistically significant, but 
economically significant as well.  Consider, for example, the effects of varying ω on the 
probability of a Sudden Stop, keeping all other variables constant at their means, except for 
DLD, which could be low (5
th percentile in our sample), average, or high (95
th percentile).  This 
is represented in Figure 2 (panel A).
33  For small values of ω, there are substantial differences in 
the probability of a Sudden Stop depending on whether DLD is low or high.  Take, for example, 
any two countries with a value of ω of 0.6 (the lowest measure of ω in our sample), and assume 
that the first country is highly dollarized (dotted line), whereas the second country is not (solid 
line).  The probability of a Sudden Stop in the highly dollarized country exceeds that of the lowly 
dollarized country by about 17 percentage points.  Now evaluate this difference for the same two 
countries when ω is equal to 1 (i.e., when CAD = 0).  The difference in the probability of a 
Sudden Stop is now only about 5 percentage points, about 30 percent of the difference at the 
lower  ω level.  The high non-linearity described by the data implies that low ω and high 
dollarization can be a very dangerous cocktail, as potential balance-sheet effects become highly 
relevant in determining the probability of a Sudden Stop.  The effects of DLD on the probability 
of a Sudden Stop are particularly important for emerging markets.  By end-1997⎯on the eve of 
the Russian crisis⎯61 percent of EMBI+ countries in our sample lay above the dollarization 
median, whereas 80 percent of developed countries lay below the dollarization median.
34  
                                                 
33 For illustration purposes, we use estimations shown in column (7) of Table 2 of the Appendix to construct this 
figure. 
34 Other developing countries are roughly evenly split above and below the median.   19
 
 
Figure 2.  Probability of a Sudden Stop for Different Values of ω 
and Domestic Liability Dollarization in the Average Country 
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We now turn to the set of variables used as controls in our regressions.  We first focus on 
measures of financial integration based on data constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  
The first measure adds the absolute value of previous period FDI asset and liability stocks as a 
share of GDP, while the second measure does the same for portfolio stocks.  A first pass suggests 
that both measures are broadly significant (mostly at the five percent level, although not 
consistently significant across specifications), indicating that higher integration reduces the 
probability of a Sudden Stop (however, these results will change for lower levels of integration 
when considering non-linear effects, described in the next section).
35      
The coefficient accompanying terms-of-trade growth is negative as expected but not 
significant at the five percent level (Appendix Table 2, columns 5 through 10).  Another variable 
                                                 
35 Debt stocks are not included because they are partly captured by public external debt and bank foreign borrowing 
(via their participation in DLD).   20
of interest regarding Sudden Stops is the exchange rate regime.  Two measures of exchange rate 
regime flexibility were used alternatively in the estimations presented in Appendix Table 2 
(columns 7 through 10).  These measures are those constructed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2002), who classify the flexibility of exchange rate regimes based on exchange rate volatility, 
exchange-rate-changes volatility, and foreign reserves volatility.
36  The first, narrower measure, 
classifies regimes into floating regimes, intermediate regimes, and fixed regimes, while the 
second measure extends this classification to five categories.  This first pass suggests that both 
measures of exchange rate flexibility turn out not to be significant (although, as reported later, 
results are significant when focusing only on the developing country group and correcting for 
potential endogeneity issues).  This finding may initially seem somewhat puzzling, but it can be 
explained by the fact that the loss of access to international credit is a real phenomenon with real 
effects such as output contraction, which in principle does not rely on the behavior of nominal 
variables.  Indeed, the framework presented in Section 2 does not rely on any particular nominal 
setup to explain the change in relative prices following a Sudden Stop, which would materialize 
under both flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes.  As a matter of fact, models that provide a 
full-fledged version of the effects of Sudden Stops on output such as Izquierdo (1999), Arellano 
and Mendoza (2002), and Calvo (2003) are concerned with real effects that are independent of 
nominal arrangements.  Of course, this does not rule out very different short-term dynamics, 
which are likely to be dependent on nominal arrangements, as was evidenced by the very 
dissimilar behavior of several emerging economies after the Sudden Stop triggered by the 
Russian crisis of 1998.  Even though most countries hit by Sudden Stops eventually experienced 
substantial real currency depreciation and output loss, the dynamics were very different for 
countries like Colombia, for example, which quickly depreciated its currency and withstood the 
real shock sooner, and Argentina, which took much longer to correct the resulting RER 
misalignment.
37  
At first glance, other macroeconomic variables that we added for control, including 
government balance as a share of GDP, and public sector external debt as a share of GDP (to 
capture effects in the same vein as our DLD variable) do not turn out to be significant across 
specifications (at least when not controlling for potential endogeneity of ω. We address this issue 
                                                 
36 Given the way the index was originally constructed, a higher value indicates less exchange rate flexibility. 
37 See Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002) for a more detailed discussion.    21
later on (see page 24)), although their coefficients show the expected signs.  This is broadly 
consistent with other empirical work on the determinants of crises that do not find a strong 
relationship between these variables and the probability of crisis.  The fact that ω as well as 
domestic DLD remain significant, while public external debt measures do not, suggests that 
valuation effects, coupled with the materialization of contingent liabilities resulting from public 
sector bailouts of private sector debts against the financial system may be key in explaining the 
likelihood of a Sudden Stop.
38  
A measure of the potential money and quasi-money liabilities that could run against 
international reserves, captured by the M2 to reserves ratio, was also added to the control group; 
again, although the coefficient accompanying this variable is positive, it is not statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level.   
Finally, another vulnerability measure that has been associated with financial crises is the 
ratio of short-term debt to international reserves.  Rodrik and Velasco (1999) use two versions of 
this variable as a determinant of financial crises for a group of emerging markets⎯separating 
short-term debt to foreign banks from other foreign short-term debt⎯and find these variables to 
be significant in explaining the probability of a financial crisis.  In a separate exercise, we use the 
same (but updated) data source employed in their study (the International Institute of Finance 
(IIF) database, comprising 31 emerging markets, substantially shrinking the sample size) to 
evaluate the impact of alternative measures of the short-term-debt-to-reserves ratio on the 
probability of a Systemic Sudden Stop.  For this relatively small subset of countries (compared to 
our sample of 110 countries used in other estimations), and controlling for balance-sheet effects, 
we do not find consistent evidence of either measure of short-term-debt-to-reserves-ratios being 
significant as a determinant of Systemic Sudden Stops.
39  This evidence is more in line with 
Frankel and Rose (1996), who find that short-term debt does not have an incidence on currency 
crises, and Eichengreen and Rose (1998), who actually find that short-term debt may decrease 
the probability of banking crises. 
 
                                                 
38 An example backing this assertion is the case of Korea, where public sector debt represented only 10 percent of 
GDP prior to its 1997 Sudden Stop, before quadrupling once the financial sector bailout was added to the fiscal 
burden. 
39 In part, this result may be due to the lack of control groups (i.e., other developing and developed countries for 




Preliminary results indicate that a key driver of the balance-sheet effects affecting the probability 
of a Sudden Stop is the potential change in relative prices captured by 1-ω.  Yet it is quite likely 
that this particular variable could be endogenous with the latent variable behind Sudden Stops 
(capital flows) given their tight linkages through adjustments in the balance of payments, as well 
as unobserved and persistent characteristics common to both variables.  Such would be the case 
of variables proxying credibility or political factors.  To tackle this potential endogeneity 
problem, we carried out a Rivers-Vuong test on the estimations previously presented in 
Appendix Table 2.
40  Based on the results of this test (see Appendix Table 3), we cannot reject 
the presence of endogeneity since the residuals obtained in the first stage of this method are 
significant in Probit estimations.
41  A second element to consider is that this correction for 
endogeneity is performed in the presence of random effects.  Therefore, in order to assess the 
significance of all variables included in the estimations in the presence of endogeneity and 
random effects, we need to construct appropriate measures of the standard deviation of their 
coefficient estimators, as standard test statistics may no longer be valid (see the Statistical 
Appendix for a discussion).  In order to do this, we rely on a non-parametric hierarchical two-
step bootstrap methodology.  Random effects introduce an intra-group correlation structure 
among observations.  This is accounted for by first randomly sampling countries with 
replacements, and, in a second stage, randomly sampling without replacement within the 
countries sampled in the first stage.  According to Davison and Hinkley (1997), this procedure 
closely mimics the intra-group correlation structure of the data mentioned above (see the 
Technical Appendix for a detailed explanation).  Confidence intervals are computed using the 
percentile method at the 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels, based on 500 replications. 
                                                 
40 Probit models can be reduced to latent variable models.  For this particular case where endogeneity in 1-ω is 
suspected, a system of two equations can be defined, one representing the latent variable behind the Sudden Stop 
variable (which is assumed to be a linear function of all variables in the Probit, including 1-ω), the other 
representing 1-ω, which is considered to be a linear function of all other variables included in the Probit estimation, 
as well as a lag in 1-ω.  Residuals from this second regression are included in the Probit regression to determine 
their significance.  If the latter are significant, endogeneity cannot be rejected. For further details, see Rivers and 
Vuong (1988), or Wooldridge (2002). 
41 Following the Rivers-Vuong approach, in the first stage we used all the other explanatory variables in the Probit 
equation and the second lag of ω as instruments of the potentially endogenous variable (ωt-1).   23
Including residuals of the first-stage regression in Probit estimations to control for 
endogeneity and using bootstrapped confidence intervals, we confirm that both 1-ω and domestic 
liability dollarization remain significant, this time at the 1 percent level in every specification.  
Results are reported in Appendix Table 3.  It is worth considering that, in particular, the 
coefficient accompanying 1-ω increases substantially compared to results shown in Appendix 
Table 2, indicating that the relevance of 1-ω increases once controlling for endogeneity.
42  This 
can be seen graphically by replicating panel (A) of Figure 2 with the new estimates, to show that 
for any given value of 1-ω, the probability of a Sudden Stop increases compared to previous 
estimates that do not control for endogeneity (see panel B of Figure 2).  Also, the non-linearity of 
balance-sheet effects prevails. 
After controlling for endogeneity and using bootstrapped confidence intervals, the public 
sector balance becomes significant at the five percent level in all specifications.  Some 
specifications show significance in terms of trade growth, although not consistently across all 
specifications. 
 
Working with the Developing Country Sample   
In order to explore whether differences in potential balance-sheet effects remain a key 
explanatory variable within the developing-country group, and that they are not just capturing 
differences between developing and developed countries (despite the inclusion of a developing 
country dummy), we repeat our estimations, this time excluding developed countries.  Results 
(already controlling for endogeneity and using bootstrapped confidence intervals) are shown in 
Appendix Table 4.  Interestingly, we confirm the same results reached with the full dataset.  Both 
1-ω and DLD remain significant at the 1 percent level.  Public balance is significant at the 1 
percent level across most specifications and terms of trade growth is significant at the 5 percent 
level in columns (4) and (5).  This last result is consistent with the case made by Caballero and 
Panageas (2003) that in countries where commodities are relevant, a fall in commodity prices 
may be accompanied by a Sudden Stop, thus amplifying the original shock.  But perhaps the key 
element to highlight here is that, for the group of developing countries, the exchange rate regime 
is significant across different definitions (three-way and five-way classification) in some 
                                                 
42 None of the previous point estimates of the coefficient accompanying 1-ω in Appendix Table 2 fall within the 
confidence interval shown in Appendix Table 3.    24
specifications, in the sense that fixed exchange rate regimes are associated with a higher 
probability of a Sudden Stop. 
 
Non-Linearities in Portfolio Integration 
An interesting result of having split the sample to include developing countries only is that 
portfolio integration changes sign and is significant at the 1 or 5 percent level in most 
specifications (see Appendix Table 4), indicating that the probability of a Sudden Stop increases 
with portfolio integration for this particular group.  This stands in stark contrast to results 
stemming from estimations including developed countries, for which the probability of a Sudden 
Stop  decreases with financial integration.  Bordo (2007) suggests that so-called “financial 
revolutions” leading to financial stability depend on a set of “deep institutional factors” that 
countries can grow up to based on a learning process derived from experiencing financial crises.   
This would imply that while countries are integrating, they may be prone to financial crises, from 
which they can learn, so as to advance in their integration process until they become financially 
stable and therefore free from episodes such as Sudden Stops.
43 
Our findings regarding the switching sign of portfolio integration and the view stated 
above led us to explore the issue of non-linearities in financial integration.  To this effect, we 
included a quadratic term of our portfolio integration measure in our estimations for the full 
sample including both developing and developed countries (see Appendix Table 5).
44  T h e  
coefficient accompanying this quadratic term is negative and significant at the 1 percent level 
accross specifications, while the linear term of portfolio integration is positive and significant at 
the 1 percent level.  The inclusion of a quadratic term does not affect the significance at the 1 
percent level of 1-ω or DLD across specifications, while the coefficient accompanying FDI 
integration is negative and now significant in almost all specifications.  The public sector balance 
remains significant at the 5 percent level. 
Figure 3 depicts the relevance of non-linearities in portfolio integration with respect to 
the probability of a Sudden Stop.  Using estimations shown in column (4) of Appendix Table 5 
(and keeping all other variables at their sample means), the results suggest that countries with 
                                                 
43 Recently, Rancière, Tornell and Westermann (2006) show that, while developing countries may be exposed to 
crises, there are still long-term benefits stemming from financial liberalization.  Their empirical findings show that 
financial liberalization fosters economic growth at the cost of a higher propensity to crises. Overall, they find a 
positive net effect of financial liberalization on growth. 
44 These estimations already control for endogeneity in 1-ω and use bootstrapped confidence intervals.   25
portfolio integration below 7.6 percent of GDP face an increasing probability of a Sudden Stop 
while, beyond this threshold, the probability of a Sudden Stop decreases with portfolio 
integration.  Of particular interest is the placement of developed, EMBI+, and other developing 
countries along this figure. Notice that while most developed countries lie to the very right, and 
other developing countries mostly lie to the left, emerging markets that are part of the EMBI+ 
index are concentrated in the region where the probability of a Sudden Stop is the highest.  This 
is the group of countries that, despite the benefits of financial integration, may be facing the 
challenge of developing deep institutions that will ensure financial stability and reduce the 
probability of financial crises.  An interesting result of this analysis is that it provides a rationale 
for a classification of emerging markets in accordance with their particular positioning in terms 
of integration and the likelihood of experiencing a Sudden Stop (a complete list of countries used 
in estimations and their position in terms of integration is provided in Table 6). 
 










































Note: The probability of a Sudden Stop is based on the 
estimation shown in column (4) of Appendix Table 5, with all 
other variables affecting the probability of a Sudden Stop 
evaluated at their sample means. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Focusing on the characteristics and determinants of large capital flow reversals of a systemic 
nature (suggestive of shocks to the supply of international funds) for a large set of developing 
and developed countries, we reach several empirical findings that open up additional areas of 
research: 
•  Systemic Sudden Stops tend to be accompanied by large RER fluctuations, a 
key ingredient for balance-sheet effects. 
•  Sudden Stops seem to come in bunches, grouping together countries that are 
different in many respects, such as fiscal stance, monetary and exchange rate 
arrangements.  This particular type of bunching suggests that when analyzing 
Sudden Stops, careful consideration should be given to financial 
vulnerabilities to external shocks. 
•  A small supply of tradable goods (relative to the absorption of tradable 
goods), a proxy for large potential changes in the RER, and Domestic 
Liability Dollarization, are key determinants of the probability of a Sudden 
Stop. 
•  Both the supply of tradable goods and the currency structure of Balance 
Sheets are in many respects the result of domestic policies.  Countries may be 
tested by foreign creditors, but vulnerability to Sudden Stops is enhanced by 
domestic factors, such as tariff and competitiveness policies affecting the 
supply of tradable goods, and badly managed fiscal and monetary policies that 
result in Domestic Liability Dollarization. 
•  The effect of balance-sheet factors on the probability of a Sudden Stop could 
be highly non-linear.  In particular, high leverage of tradables absorption and 
high Domestic Liability Dollarization could be a dangerous cocktail. 
•  The probability of a Sudden Stop initially increases with financial 
integration⎯departing from low levels of financial integration⎯but 
eventually decreases, and is virtually nil at high levels of integration.   
Emerging markets largely stand in a gray area in-between developed and other 
developing countries, where the probability of a Sudden Stop is the highest,   27
suggesting that financial integration can be risky when not accompanied by 
the development of institutions that will support the use more sophisticated 
and credible financial instruments.  
 
Although our work has established the empirical relevance of balance-sheet effects on the 
likelihood of Sudden Stops, it does not cover two other topics that represent important extensions 
of the present line of research, namely, the consequences of Sudden Stops and balance sheet 
effects on economic growth, particularly in dollarized economies, as well as the role that 
international reserves could have in lowering the probability of Sudden Stops, by ameliorating 
the impact of balance-sheet effects . 
45 
46  We leave these topics for future research.
                                                 
45 Relevant work in this direction has recently been conducted by Edwards (2003) and Rancière, Tornell and 
Westermann (2006), but balance-sheet effects still need to be incorporated into this line of research.   
46 Preliminary work by Calvo, Izquierdo and Loo-Kung (forthcoming 2008) suggests that DLD net of foreign 
reserves as a share of GDP also works as a significant determinant of the probability of a Systemic Sudden Stop.  
This result could be used to compute an optimal level of international reserves that balances the costs of holding 
reserves against the benefit of lowering the probability of Sudden Stop.        28
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Appendix Table 1 
List of Systemic Sudden Stop Episodes 
 
 
Country  Begins Ends      Country  Begins Ends 
Developing countries      
Developing countries 
(continued)    
Angola  1999m12 2001m3   Malawi  1997m12 1998m2 
Argentina 1995m1  1995m12    Malaysia 1994m12  1995m9 
Argentina  1999m5 1999m11    Mexico  1994m3 1995m11 
Armenia 1997m12  1998m1    Moldova 1998m6  1999m8 
Armenia  1998m9 2000m2    Mozambique  1995m3 1996m5 
Azerbaijan  1997m9 1998m3    Nepal  1998m5 1999m7 
Azerbaijan  1999m11 2001m4   Oman  1999m11 2001m4 
Barbados  1999m1 1999m3    Pakistan  1995m9 1996m2 
Belarus  1999m2 2000m1    Pakistan  1998m5 1999m1 
Belize 1994m10  1995m9    Paraguay  1999m9  2001m5 
Bolivia 1999m12  2000m10    Peru  1997m7  1998m2 
Brazil 1995m1  1995m6    Peru  1999m2  1999m11 
Brazil 1998m9  1999m8    Philippines  1995m5  1995m11 
Bulgaria 1995m12  1996m10    Philippines  1997m5  1999m7 
Cape  Verde  1993m9 1994m7    Poland  1999m3 2000m5 
Cape Verde  1997m3  1998m1    Sierra Leone  1998m1  1998m11 
Chile 1995m10  1996m8    Slovak  Republic  1997m7  1998m4 
Chile  1998m6 1999m6    Slovak  Republic  1999m5 1999m9 
Colombia 1997m12  2000m7    Slovenia  1998m6  1999m6 
Costa Rica  1998m8  2000m8    Sri Lanka  1995m1  1996m8 
Croatia 1998m9  1999m11    St.  Kitts and Nevis  1993m7  1994m6 
Dominican Republic  1994m3  1995m5    St. Vincent and the Grenadines  1995m2  1995m9 
Ecuador  1995m5  1996m11    St. Vincent and the Grenadines  1999m3  1999m9 
Ecuador 1999m7  2000m10    Suriname  1993m1  1994m5 
El Salvador  1999m2  1999m10    Thailand  1996m12  1998m7 
Estonia 1998m10  2000m2    Tonga  1998m4  1998m9 
Guinea-Bissau  1999m1 1999m6    Turkey  1994m3 1995m1 
Honduras  1995m10 1996m9   Turkey  1998m10 1999m9 
Hong Kong, China  1998m7  1999m7    Uruguay  1999m3  1999m4 
Indonesia 1997m12  1998m11    Uruguay  1999m12  2000m2 
Indonesia 1999m12  2000m11    Yemen,  Rep.  1994m6  1996m3 
Jordan 1994m12  1995m5    Zimbabwe  1992m8  1994m10 
Jordan 1998m10  1999m6    Zimbabwe  1997m6  1998m6 
Korea, Rep.  1997m8  1998m11    Zimbabwe  1999m9  2001m5 
Lao PDR  1997m7  1998m9    Developed countries    
Latvia  1999m4 1999m9    Austria  1992m2 1992m2 
Lithuania  1999m5 2000m5    France  1992m1 1992m9 
       Greece  1992m11  1993m7 
       Portugal  1992m10  1993m9 
       Spain  1992m4  1993m8 
            Sweden  1992m1  1992m3 
   33
             Appendix Table 2 
Panel PROBIT 
All Countries – Dependent Variable: Systemic Sudden Stop 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
l-ωt-1  1.583  1.339  2.986  2.828  2.249  2.793  2.022  2.010  1.957  1.656 
  (0.489)***  (0.495)***  (0.679)***  (0.683)***  (0.709)***  (0.658)***  (0.711)***  (0.709)***  (0.718)***  (0.771)** 
DLD t-1  1.005 0.769 2.109 2.168 2.611 1.571 1.977 1.957 2.063 2.203 
  (0.419)**  (0.421)*  (0.726)*** (0.736)*** (0.812)***  (0.631)** (0.786)** (0.784)** (0.808)**  (0.825)*** 
Developing Dummy     0.859  0.482  0.075  -0.218  0.184  0.132  0.120  0.274  0.249 
    (0.315)***  (0.343)  (0.424)  (0.454)  (0.366)  (0.451)  (0.448)  (0.474)  (0.548) 
FDI Integration t-1      -1.803 -1.359 -0.671 -1.223 -0.840 -0.833 -0.806 -0.923 
     (0.530)***  (0.527)***  (0.581)  (0.463)*** (0.578)  (0.576)  (0.587)  (0.608) 
Portfolio Integration t-1        -3.022  -5.018  -2.531  -4.460  -4.462  -4.953  -4.269 
        (1.872)  (2.167)**  (1.667)  (2.150)**  (2.142)**  (2.220)**  (2.299)* 
TOT Growth t       -0.752  -0.233  -0.585  -0.575  -0.542  -0.354 
       (0.745)  (0.707)  (0.767)  (0.767)  (0.777)  (0.807) 
Public Balance/GDP t-1            -0.006  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003 
            (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Ex. Regime 3 t-1         0.151     
         (0.116)     
Ex. Regime 5 t-1                0.092  0.098  0.097 
                (0.074)  (0.075)  (0.077) 
M2 over Reserves t-1           0.014  0.014 
           (0.011)  (0.012) 
Public External Debt/ GDP t-1                    0.000 
                    (0.000) 
Constant  -2.432 -3.060 -2.077 -1.776 -2.318 -1.486 -2.579 -2.587 -2.871 -2.863 
  (0.197)*** (0.339)*** (0.359)*** (0.437)*** (0.472)*** (0.373)*** (0.546)*** (0.555)*** (0.611)*** (0.669)*** 
Observations  1081  1081  927  921  903  849  796  796  795  661 
Number of Countries  110  110  94  94  90  84  83  83  83  72 
            
McFadden adj R2  0.138  0.146  0.176  0.187 0.207 0.120 0.216 0.216 0.215 0.196 
% correctly predicted 
(PCP) 
0.884 0.884 0.894 0.893 0.889 0.876 0.883 0.887 0.889 0.870 
Adjusted PCP  -0.025  -0.025  0.125  0.116 0.065 0.000 0.079 0.109 0.129 0.122 
Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include time dummies and random effects. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.    34
Appendix Table 3 
Panel PROBIT – Rivers & Voung Approach 
All Countries – Dependent Variable: Systemic Sudden Stop 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
Residuals t  -3.485*** -3.344*** -7.839*** -7.776*** -8.812*** -7.321*** -7.795*** -7.748*** -7.597***  -12.172*** 
  [-8.34,-1.97]  [-8.20,-1.85]  [-15.55,-5.49] [-17.41,-5.59] [-21.35,-6.11] [-16.12,-5.17] [-19.81,-3.82] [-19.82,-5.58] [-21.38,-4.81] [-40.69,-5.32] 
l-ω t-1  3.490***  3.224***  8.895***  8.920***  9.443***  8.250***  8.012***  7.969***  7.781***  12.127*** 
  [2.61,9.47]  [2.39,9.03]  [6.97,18.94]  [7.66,24.40]  [7.63,25.34]  [6.26,20.04]  [5.93,26.58]  [5.89,26.21]  [6.42,28.31]  [8.75,47.90] 
DLD t-1  1.983*** 1.755*** 4.119*** 3.900*** 4.164*** 3.227*** 4.100*** 4.062*** 4.082*** 2.324*** 
  [1.06,4.92] [0.12,4.83] [3.29,8.68] [2.70,8.92] [3.01,9.89] [2.17,8.22]  [3.33,11.93]  [3.14,11.55]  [3.32,13.03]  [1.29,8.07] 
Developing Dummy     0.757**  0.03  -0.379  -0.01  0.172  -0.055  -0.073  0.099  -0.185 
     [0.13,2.25]  [-0.64,0.99]  [-1.48,0.92]  [-1.06,1.21]  [-0.65,1.43]  [-1.37,1.61]  [-1.33,1.63]  [-1.27,1.71]  [-1.67,1.54] 
FDI Integration t-1          -2.675*** -2.129***  -0.969**  -1.660*** -1.958*** -1.920*** -1.806*** -2.665*** 
          [-6.45,-2.23] [-5.86,-1.45] [-3.71,-0.18] [-4.69,-0.74] [-8.51,-0.37] [-8.47,-1.18] [-9.36,-0.62] [-8.94,-1.85] 
Portfolio Integration t-1           -3.112  -2.672  -1.249  -2.683  -2.694  -2.413  -0.47 
           [-8.92,0.28]  [-9.72,0.58]  [-5.06,2.21]  [-10.61,1.76]  [-11.06,1.79]  [-10.80,1.85]  [-7.17,4.81] 
TOT Growth t              -1.363*  -1.296*  -0.903  -0.898  -0.914  -0.734 
              [-4.58,-0.14]  [-3.78,-0.15]  [-3.79,0.81]  [-3.54,0.76]  [-3.90,0.73]  [-3.58,0.94] 
Public Balance/GDP t-1                 -0.065**  -0.093**  -0.093***  -0.091**  -0.100*** 
                 [-0.19,-0.03]  [-0.47,-0.03]  [-3.91,-0.02]  [-0.36,-0.02]  [-1.40,-0.02] 
Ex. Regime 3 t-1                    0.182          
                    [-0.02,0.60]          
Ex. Regime 5 t-1                       0.093  0.092  0.081 
                       [-0.04,0.36]  [-0.05,0.33]  [-0.06,0.33] 
M2 over Reserves t-1                          0.005  -0.007 
                          [-0.03,0.03]  [-0.06,0.02] 
Public External Debt/ GDP t-1                             0.000 
                             [-0.00,0.00] 
Constant  -2.610*** -3.169*** -2.108*** -1.847*** -3.135*** -2.083*** -3.090*** -3.029*** -3.266***  -2.7294*** 
  [-4.24,-2.75]  [-6.0, -3.28]  [-4.29,-1.83]  [-4.39, -1.27]  [-6.25, -2.87]  [-4.53, -1.58]  [-8.46,-2.64]  [-16.96,-2.67]  [-9.62, -2.85] [-17.04,  -1.87] 
Observations  1071  1071  919  913  897  843  792  792  791  658 
Number of Countries  110  110  94  94  90  84  83  83  83  72 
            
McFadden adj R2  0.144  0.15  0.229 0.232 0.261 0.182 0.286 0.285 0.280 0.273 
% correctly predicted 
(PCP) 
0.873 0.875 0.887 0.885 0.893 0.875 0.896 0.895 0.900 0.881 
Adjusted PCP  -0.115  -0.098 0.071 0.063 0.103 0.000 0.188 0.178 0.218 0.204 
All regressions include time dummies and random effects. 
•  significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, using bootstrapped confidence intervals constructed by the percentile method, shown in brackets.         35
Appendix Table 4 
Panel PROBIT – Rivers & Voung Approach 
Developing Countries – Dependent Variable: Systemic Sudden Stop 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Residuals t  -4.327*** -8.898*** -9.718***  -10.674***  -10.035***  -9.082*** -9.008*** -8.820***  -13.806*** 
  [-10.85,-1.34] [-24.07,-5.86] [-32.82,-5.99] [-33.07,-6.82] [-33.11,-6.05] [-30.03,-5.61] [-29.75,-5.06] [-28.88,-5.66] [-50.70,-7.35] 
l-ω t-1  3.681***  9.037***  9.865***  10.876***  9.978***  8.893***  8.823***  8.625***  13.259*** 
  [2.13,10.59]  [6.01,31.34]  [7.51,37.21]  [8.71,39.70]  [7.43,41.68]  [7.35,34.11]  [6.61,33.12]  [6.09,31.45]  [10.38,58.06] 
DLD t-1  2.387*** 4.138*** 3.587*** 3.720*** 3.578*** 3.771*** 3.728*** 3.715*** 2.477*** 
  [1.12,7.16]  [3.02,11.16] [2.60,12.33] [2.74,11.96] [2.54,12.61] [3.16,14.24] [3.11,13.38] [3.02,12.31] [1.29,11.11] 
FDI Integration t-1     0.229  -0.732**  -0.459  -1.170**  -1.196**  -1.153**  -1.145**  -1.314** 
     [-1.24,1.15]  [-3.24,-0.02]  [-2.85,0.36]  [-5.87,-0.15]  [-6.99,-0.32]  [-6.55,-0.02]  [-5.85,-0.26]  [-6.13,-0.07] 
Portfolio Integration t-1        7.914***  8.202***  8.274***  6.895***  6.706**  6.505**  3.827 
          [0.91,28.89] [0.53,36.30] [0.98,31.00] [0.38,32.01] [2.75,22.64] [2.17,22.58] [-0.44,14.19] 
TOT Growth t           -1.924**  -2.015**  -1.504  -1.493  -1.454  -1.519* 
           [-6.32,-0.52]  [-6.58,-0.11]  [-4.72,0.02]  [-5.00,0.02]  [-4.86,0.11]  [-5.18,-0.17] 
Public Balance/GDP t-1              -0.103**  -0.099***  -0.098***  -0.097***  -0.096*** 
              [-0.45,-0.03]  [-5.26,-0.02]  [-7.46,-0.01]  [-4.39,-0.02]  [-6.30,-0.01] 
Ex. Regime 3 t-1                 0.249**          
                 [0.04,1.00]          
Ex. Regime 5 t-1                    0.133*  0.129  0.068 
                    [0.03,0.53]  [-0.01,0.54]  [-0.10,0.40] 
M2 over Reserves t-1                       0.01  0.013 
                       [-0.03,0.06]  [-0.02,0.07] 
Public External Debt/ GDP t-1                          0.000 
                          [-0.00,0.00] 
Constant  -3.685***  -4.162***  -4.043***  -4.307***  -4.051***  -4.465***  -4.416***  -4.420***  -4.137*** 
  [-6.93,-3.77]  [-13.10,-4.16]  [-10.11,-4.04]  [-10.69, -4.21]  [-12.26,-3.95]  [-13.76, -4.65]  [-17.67, -4.41]  [-12.98, -4.26]  [-14.15, -3.93] 
Observations  833 681 675 660 606 566 566 565 540 
Number  of  Countries  89 73 73 70 64 63 63 63 60 
           
Mcfadden R2  0.225  0.306  0.304  0.304 0.315 0.310 0.309 0.305 0.299 
% correctly predicted 
(PCP) 
0.845 0.858 0.858 0.862 0.863 0.862 0.862 0.869 0.867 
Adjusted PCP  -0.085  0.093  0.103 0.108 0.170 0.196 0.196 0.237 0.242 
All regressions include time dummies and random effects. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, using bootstrapped confidence intervals constructed by the percentile method, shown in brackets.       
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Appendix Table 5 
Panel PROBIT – Rivers & Vuong Approach – Non-linear Portfolio Integration 
All Countries – Dependent Variable: Systemic Sudden Stop 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Residuals t  -8.462*** -9.253*** -8.624*** -7.865*** -7.628*** -7.920***  -12.376*** 
  [-19.29,-5.20] [-19.64,-6.16] [-24.96,-5.73] [-22.08,-5.02] [-19.07,-4.94] [-30.02,-4.63] [-39.99,-7.07] 
l-ω t-1  9.418***  10.069***  8.719***  8.159***  7.915***  8.104***  12.166*** 
  [7.16,23.11]  [8.77,25.05]  [6.76,32.24]  [6.42,23.84]  [6.41,22.22]  [6.45,38.68]  [9.19,46.31] 
DLD t-1  3.275*** 3.390*** 3.847*** 3.613*** 3.364*** 3.742*** 1.934*** 
  [2.66,8.29]  [2.55,8.58] [3.07,12.93]  [2.90,11.36] [2.65,8.31] [2.74,13.72] [0.97,6.87] 
Developing Dummy  0.074  -0.014  -0.026  -0.063  0.193  -0.117  -0.178 
  [-0.71,1.56]  [-0.86,1.68]  [-1.05,1.19]  [-1.06,1.49]  [-0.48,1.67]  [-1.22,1.30]  [-1.48,9.04] 
FDI Integration t-1  -1.118***  -0.881**  -0.472  -1.743*** -1.369*** -1.337*** -2.046*** 
  [-5.98,-0.40] [-3.69,-0.20] [-3.40,0.26] [-8.78,-1.02] [-7.80,-0.20] [-8.67,-0.09]  [-12.03,-0.95] 
Portfolio Integration t-1  19.795***  19.255***  21.041***  17.352***  17.256***  17.477***  19.979*** 
  [11.31,57.80]  [11.06,63.73]  [9.84,76.56]  [3.54,66.24]  [8.52,60.49]  [2.29,67.24]  [3.09,74.52] 
(Portfolio Integration t-1)
2  -131.847*** -129.510*** -146.245*** -114.123*** -106.417*** -122.164*** -114.179*** 
  [-383.44,-69.52] [-392.86,-73.46] [-486.64,-86.21] [-453.30,-47.81] [-319.77,-61.04] [-477.44,-46.08] [-515.38,-31.34] 
TOT Growth t     -1.016  -1.741*  -0.688  -0.468  -0.811  -0.614 
     [-3.67,0.18]  [-4.66,-0.40]  [-3.30,0.98]  [-3.28,0.98]  [-3.70,0.83]  [-3.47,1.40] 
Public Balance/GDP t-1        -0.091**  -0.095**  -0.076**  -0.092***  -0.098*** 
          [-0.36,-0.02] [-0.39,-0.02] [-1.80,-0.02] [-5.21,-0.02] [-3.82,-0.02] 
Ex. Regime 3 t-1           0.125          
           [-0.08,0.48]          
Ex. Regime 5 t-1              0.045  0.077  0.067 
              [-0.08,0.23]  [-0.06,0.36]  [-0.09,0.29] 
M2 over Reserves t-1                 0.007  -0.002 
                 [-0.02,0.04]  [-0.05,0.03] 
Public External Debt/ GDP t-1                    0.000 
                    [-0.00,0.00] 
Constant  -2.813***  -2.847***  -3.973***  -3.153***  -2.954***  -3.484***  -3.229*** 
  [-6.11, -2.61]  [-6.92, -2.64]  [-15.71, -3.87]  [-10.21, -2.98]  [-6.50, -2.67]  [-10.74, -3.23]  [-16.45, -2.75] 
Observations  913 897 843 792 792 791 658 
Number of Countries  94 90 84 83 83 83 72 
         
McFadden adjR2  0.275 0.269 0.320 0.300 0.275 0.307 0.295 
% correctly predicted (PCP)  0.900 0.899 0.897 0.896 0.896 0.899 0.884 
Adjusted PCP  0.188 0.150 0.171 0.188 0.188 0.208 0.224 
All regressions include time dummies and random effects. 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, using bootstrapped confidence intervals constructed by the percentile method, shown in brackets. 
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Appendix Table 6 
 
Countries in which Portfolio Integration Affects Positively the 
Probability of Sudden Stop    Countries in which Portfolio Integration Affects Negatively  the 
Probability of Sudden Stop 
        
Country  Portfolio Integration    Country  Portfolio Integration 
Azerbaijan 0.0%    Czech  Republic 8.0% 
Bolivia 0.0%    Mexico  9.5% 
Cyprus 0.0%    Thailand  11.4% 
Ethiopia 0.0%    Greece  11.6% 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.0%    Japan  12.1% 
Mozambique 0.0%    Chile  14.1% 
Sudan 0.0%    Austria  14.2% 
Zimbabwe 0.0%    Italy  19.2% 
Haiti 0.0%    Malaysia 20.1% 
Zambia 0.0%    New  Zealand  20.1% 
Nigeria* 0.0%    Spain  20.2% 
Yemen, Rep.  0.0%    Portugal  22.8% 
Uganda 0.0%    Norway  22.9% 
Kuwait 0.1%    Germany  23.9% 
Ecuador* 0.1%    United  States 24.0% 
Jamaica 0.1%    Denmark  24.9% 
Paraguay 0.1%    South  Africa  26.8% 
Angola 0.1%    France  27.2% 
Belarus 0.1%    Australia  28.1% 
Lao PDR  0.1%    Canada  42.4% 
Armenia 0.2%    Sweden  54.8% 
Georgia 0.2%    Belgium  55.9% 
Kenya 0.3%    Finland  62.1% 
El Salvador  0.4%    United Kingdom  69.5% 
Trinidad and Tobago  0.4%    Netherlands  88.5% 
Romania  0.4%    Hong Kong, China  133.7% 
Malawi 0.5%    Switzerland  149.7% 
Uruguay 0.6%       
Costa Rica  0.6%       
Dominican Republic  0.7%       
Moldova 0.7%       
Lithuania 0.8%       
Sri Lanka  0.8%       
Bulgaria* 0.8%       
Oman 0.9%       
Jordan 1.0%       
Ukraine* 1.1%       
Kazakhstan 1.2%      
Slovenia 1.3%       
Latvia 1.4%       
Colombia* 1.5%       
Pakistan 1.7%       
Mauritius 1.8%       
Poland* 2.0%       
Croatia 2.4%       
Egypt, Arab Rep.*  2.9%       
Turkey* 3.0%       
Indonesia 4.3%       
Peru* 5.4%       
Venezuela, RB*  5.7%       
Korea, Rep.*  6.0%       
Brazil* 6.4%       
Argentina* 6.7%       
Philippines* 7.2%       
Hungary 7.4%       
Estonia 7.6%       
* Countries tracked by JP Morgan’s EMBI+. 
Note: Countries in which portfolio integration affects positively (negatively) the probability of sudden stop are those whose average portfolio integration 
is below (above) 7.6%. This cutoff value was calculated as the level of portfolio integration that maximizes the probability of sudden stop: -α/2β; where α 
is the estimated coefficient of the linear term of portfolio integration and β is the estimated coefficient of the quadratic term of portfolio integration. This 
cutoff value was calculated using equation 4 of Appendix Table 5. The list shows the average of portfolio integration for observations that were included 
in the estimation of equation 4. If instead averages were computed for all available data of portfolio integration from 1990 to 2004, Czech Republic 
would move to the group of countries in which portfolio integration affects positively the probability of a Sudden Stop. In addition, Iceland, Israel, 
Bahrain, Libya, United Arab Emirates, Ireland and Luxemburg would be listed in the group in which portfolio integration affects negatively the 
probability of a Sudden Stop. The rest of countries in Lane and Millesi-Ferreti’s (2006) dataset not mentioned in this note or in the table would be listed 
in the group in which portfolio integration affects positively the probability of a Sudden Stop.    38
Data Appendix 
 
Our sample of 110 countries is divided into 21 developed economies and 89 developing economies. Our choice of developed countries 
is dictated by OECD membership, and it includes Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and USA.  The list of developing countries includes: 
Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape 
Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El 
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, Malaysia, 
Maldives, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela RB, Yemen Rep., Zambia and Zimbabwe.  Data are collected on an annual basis unless otherwise stated. 
Data spans from 1992 to 2004. 
 
Variable Definitions  and  Sources 
Capital Flows Proxy  A monthly proxy is obtained by netting out changes in international reserves from the trade 
balance.  Based on this proxy, 12-month cumulative annual flows are constructed for each month
Annual differences of the latter are then used to measure capital account changes.  All figures are
expressed in 2000 US dollars.  Source: IMF IFS.  
Aggregate Sovereign Bond 
Spread Index 
EMBI for EMs (source: J.P. Morgan), Euro-area government bond spread index for Euro-area 
countries (source: Merrill Lynch), G7 government bond spread index for all remaining 
developed countries (source: Merrill Lynch). 
Systemic Sudden Stop (3S) Dummy  We define a 3S dummy as a capital-flow window that overlaps at any point in time with an 
aggregate-spread window.  A capital-flow window contains a large fall in the capital flows 
proxy exceeding two standard deviations from its mean (that starts when the fall in the capital 
flows proxy exceeds one standard deviation, and ends when it is smaller than one standard 
deviation).  Capital-flow windows less than 6 months apart were considered as part of the same 
event.  Aggregate-spread windows contain those years in which a spike in the corresponding 
bond spread index exceeds two standard deviations from its mean (it starts when I the spread 
exceeds one standard deviation, and ends when it is smaller than one standard deviation).  All 
calculations were performed at a monthly frequency and then transformed to annual frequency 
for Probit estimation. 
Absorption of tradable goods (Z)  Imports plus tradable output domestically consumed, proxied by the sum of agricultural and 
industrial output minus exports.  More specifically, we construct the share of tradable output in   39
total output as the ratio of agriculture plus industrial output to total GDP at constant prices.  
Next, we multiply this share by total dollar GDP to obtain the dollar value of tradable output.  
We do this in order to avoid excessive fluctuations in output composition due to valuation 
effects that are present in sectoral data at current prices.  Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
CAD  Current account deficit. Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. 
Domestic Liability Dollarization 
(DLD) 
For developed economies: BIS reporting banks’ local asset positions in foreign currency as a 
share of GDP (since data for Australia and New Zealand is not available from this source, we 
used data from their respective Central Banks). For developing economies: dollar deposits 
obtained from Levy-Yeyati (2006) (based on Honohan and Shi (2002)) plus bank foreign 
borrowing (IMFIFS banking institutions line 26c) as a share of GDP. 
FDI Integration  FDI Liabilities plus FDI Assets over GDP. Source: Lane and Millesi-Ferreti (2006) 
Portfolio Integration  Portfolio Liabilities plus Portfolio Assets over GDP. Source: Lane and Millesi-Ferreti (2006) 
External Public Debt  Data on external public debt were obtained from IMF IFS (for some developing countries, data 
was obtained from World Bank’s Global Development Finance database (GDF). 
TOT growth  Annual rate of change of terms of trade on goods and services. Source: IMF’s WEO (April 
2006). 
Ex. Regime 3  3-way exchange regime classification: 1 = float; 2 = intermediate (dirty, dirty/crawling peg); 3 = 
fix. Source: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
Ex. Regime 5  5-way exchange regime classification: 1 = inconclusive; 2 = float; 3 = dirty; 4 = dirty/crawling 
peg; 5 = fix. Source: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
GDP  Gross domestic product. Source: IMF’s WEO database. 
M2  Money plus quasi-money. Source IMF IFS. 
Public Balance  General government balance to GDP ratio. Source: IMF’s WEO database. 
Large RER depreciation dummy  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a large rise on RER (vis-à-vis US dollar) occurs 
and 0, otherwise. We define a rise in the RER (i.e., real depreciation of the currency) to be large 
when it exceeds two standard deviations above the sample mean prevailing before the rise. 
Reserves  International Reserves.  Source:  IMF IFS 
Short-term debt to foreign banks and other short-
term debt due to foreigners 
Source:  International Institute of Finance Database.  Short-term debt to foreign banks (series 
D353).  Other short-term debt was obtained by subtracting series D353 from series D204 (total 
short-term debt). 
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Technical Appendix 
 






This note is concerned with estimation and inference in a random effects Probit specification 
allowing for possibly endogenous explanatory variables. The standard random effects Probit 
model with exogenous explanatory variables is: 
 
   it i it it x y ε μ β + + ′ =
* , i=1,2, … , n;  t=1,2, …,T 
 
where xit is a k vector of exogenous explanatory variables, β is a k vector of coefficients, μi is 
IN(0,
2
μ σ ), and εit  is IN(0, 
2
ε σ ). The observed binary random variable yit is related to the model 
through: 
 
0] y [ 1 y
*
it it > =  
 
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of this model is extensively studied in Heckman 
(1981) and reviewed in Hsiao (2003). The likelihood function for this problem is given by: 
 















































ε μ σ σ ρ / ≡ . The evaluation of the integral in the previous expression is not trivial and it 
is usually carried out through Hermite integration or simulation.  
 
Guilkey and Murphy (1993) conducted an extensive Monte Carlo experiment to study the 
small sample behavior of alternative estimation strategies of the random effects Probit model. 
The most important results that are relevant for this study are summarized below: 
 
1.  Standard probit and MLE of the random effects Probit provide consistent estimation of β. 
2.  The standard Probit estimator of the standard errors of the estimators is markedly 
downward biased, leading to incorrect inferences, in the sense of suggesting significant 
coefficients when in fact they are not. 
3.  The random effects MLE based estimator provides more accurate estimators of the 
standard errors but the gain in performance is relatively mild when compared to that of 
the standard Probit. 
                                                 
47 Universidad de San Andrés, Victoria, Argentina. Email: wsosa@udesa.edu.ar. Martin Cicowiez provided 
excellent computing support.   41
4.  For small individual observations (N around 25), the numerical accuracy problems 
involved in the evaluation of the integral shown above severely affect the performance of 
the procedure, invalidating the use of standard asymptotic approximations. 
 
The possibility of allowing for endogenous explanatory variables has been studied in the 




j u x z y + ′ + = β γ ,      j=1,2,…,J 
 
where uj is IN(0, 
2
u σ ), and xj, β and 
*
j y  are defined as in the previous model, and zj is a possibly 
endogenous explanatory variable. Rivers and Vuong (1988) provided a simple estimation 




j j v x ~ z + = δ  
 
and (uj, vj) have a bivariate normal distribution independent of  j x ~
.  j x ~  is a vector of exogenous 
explanatory variables in the reduced-form model for zj, which in this context is endogenous if 
and only if uj and vj are correlated. Rivers and Vuong (1988) propose a consistent estimation
48 
based on a two-step approach: 
 
•  Step 1: Run the OLS regression of zj on  j x ~  and save residuals  j v ˆ . 
 
•  Step 2: Run a standard Probit regression of yj on xj, zj and  j v ˆ . 
 
Details of the procedure can be checked in the original reference and in Wooldridge 
(2002). The main intuition behind the result comes from the fact that under bivariate normality of 
u and v, we can write uj = θvj + ηj where ηj is independent of  j x ~  and vj. Then, replacing in the 
definition of 
*
j y : 
 
j j j j j v x z y η θ β γ + + ′ + =
*  
 
If vj were observable, consistent estimation could proceed by a standard Probit regression 
of yj on zj, xj and vj, since, by construction, all explanatory variables are exogenous with respect 
to ηj. The first stage of the Rivers-Vuong procedure replaces vj by a consistent estimate obtained 
from OLS regression in a first stage. 
 
The performance of the Rivers and Vuong (1998) procedure in the context of the random 
effects specification has not been explored, and though it deserves a more detailed exploration 
than the one offered here, some insights can be discussed. A simple extension in the panel 
context, as described in the first equation of this appendix, is to allow for endogenous 
                                                 
48 It is important to remark that, as it is usual in binary choice index models, not all the parameters are identified, 
hence appropriate normalizations must be adopted. See Rivers and Vuong (1998) for details on this subject.   42
explanatory variables by allowing for correlation between the observation specific error term of 
the index model (εit) and the error term of the reduced form of the possibly endogenous 
explanatory variable (vit). In this context, the index model can be written as: 
 
it i it it it
*
it v x z y η μ θ β γ + + + ′ + =  
 
and, again, if vit were observable, the model should be unaltered albeit for some redefinition of 
relevant parameters.  In this case, the Rivers-Vuong procedure is replacing an exogenous 
explanatory variable (vit) with a consistent estimate obtained from a first stage regression. 
 
  An important problem is how to perform reliable inference with the proposed method.  
As discussed previously, Guilkey and Murphy (1993) suggest that the numerical accuracy 
problem related to the evaluation of the likelihood function of the random effects Probit makes 
asymptotic approximations very unreliable.  A natural possibility is to consider a bootstrap 
approach.  The nature of such procedure in this context is complicated due to the fact that, by 
construction, observations are not independent due to the presence of a random effect.  In this 
note we follow Davidson and Hinkley (1997) and use a non-parametric hierarchical two-step 
bootstrap strategy, where in a first stage, individuals are randomly sampled with replacements, 
and, in a second stage, observations are randomly sampled without replacement within the 
individuals sampled in the first stage.  According to Davison and Hinkley (1997, pp. 100-102), 
this procedure closely mimics the intra-group correlation structure of the data, due to the 
presence of the individual random effect. 
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